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Introduction
Throughout its development, psychiatry has struggled to legitimate itself as a
scientific and medical discipline. Much of this struggle has been attributed to a lack of
consensus regarding the nature of mental illness as well as a standard methodology for
making diagnoses. In an attempt to eliminate this impediment to psychiatry's scientific
advancement, the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM) was published in 1980 with significant methodological changes to the
nature of classification and approach to clinical diagnoses. Similar to the
characterization of modern psychiatry as being amidst a Kraepelinian revival, this
highly influential text is often associated with and regarded as an adaptation of the
psychiatric nosology of Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926). This paper begins by asking, what
lead to this Kraepelinian revival? Secondly and as the primary focus will be an
investigation of how "Kraepelinian" this "neo-Kraepelinian" manifestation in the DSM III
actually was. Addressing the latter will lead to an examination of (1) the technical and
contextual differences between Kraepelin's and the DSM's classification of the major
psychoses and (2) the ontological differences between and consequences of the
respective nosologies. Ultimately, it is argued that the DSM's neo-Kraepelinian
translation of Kreapelin's work has deviated from it in consequentially problematic
ways. But first, it is necessary to define the technical terms which will be used
throughout this paper.

Defining the technical terms
The term reliability refers to the degree to which a measuring procedure of a particular
phenomenon yields consistent results in repeated trials. In psychiatric diagnoses,
inter-rater reliability refers to how often clinicians arrive at the same diagnosis given an
identical set of data and a given patient. A central goal of psychiatric nosology is
diagnostic reliability, and a central goal of psychiatric practice is to demonstrate a high
degree of inter-rater reliability.
The term validity refers to the degree to which a measuring procedure measures what it
purports to measure. As it applies to psychiatric nosology, it refers to whether or not a
diagnostic category maps onto a true disorder. Kendell and Jablensky propose the
following condition for determining validity:
(1) If the defining characteristic of a category is a syndrome, then the syndrome must
be separated from other syndromes and normality by a "zone of rarity" criterion, i.e.,
"natural boundary" (clear-cut boundary at the level of defining characteristic) (5).
In addition, there are two other forms of validity which are pertinent to the discussion of
DSM categories (Carmines and Zeller, 17, 22-23);
(1) Predictive validity concerns the degree to which a measuring instrument
accurately predicts some form of behavior which is external to the measuring
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instrument itself. If a diagnostic category is meant to predict how a person with that
diagnosis will behave, it can be said to have predictive validity if it accurately predicts
how a person with that diagnosis will behave.
(2) Construct validity is the extent to which there is a correlation between a
particular measurement and other measures consistent with theoretically derived
hypotheses concerning the constructs that are being measured. As an example, to
measure the construct validity of a particular measure of narcissism, say DSM-defined
Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD), one would consider the relation between the
construct and a theoretical hypothesis derived from the construct of DSM-defined NPD.
If there is a high correlation between these two measurements then it would constitute
a piece of evidence in support of the construct validity of DSM-defined NPD.
The term pathognomonic refers to a sign or symptom which is definitively indicative of a
particular condition. While it is not necessary for the associated diagnosis, it is
sufficient in that it is specific to a particular condition and not any others.
In what follows is a consideration of a brief history of psychiatry which will be helpful in
understanding the factors that contributed to the "Kraepelinian revival" characterizing
modern psychiatry.

Part I A Brief History: The Development of Psychiatry and Resurgence of Kraepelin
Ideas about the nature of mental illness are as old as our history allows. The
ancient Greeks viewed madness as a result of elemental and humoral imbalances.
While this perspective persisted in part through the Middle Ages in Europe, religious
influences at the time effectually placed the mentally ill within the domain of morality.
Throughout most of the eighteenth century, individuals were held in asylums and
subjected to cruel environments as a means of separation from the rest of society
rather than therapeutic intervention. It was not until approximately the middle of the
nineteenth century that psychiatry emerged as a medical specialty. The German
psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926) was a prominent figure in this development.
Before Kraepelin, there was little to no consensus on the nosology of mental
illness. A proponent of biological psychiatry, he paved the way for a more scientifically
based study of and classificatory system for mental illness. After categorizing as many
mental illnesses in accordance with biological etiology, he was left with a large group of
patients with psychotic conditions that lacked any apparent pathophysiologic
explanation (Klerman, 100). His differentiation of these psychoses into dementia
praecox and manic-depressive insanity was criticized for precisely this reason. Despite
this, today Kraepelin's legacy endures in virtue of this distinction. While most
psychiatrists in Europe continued to follow Kraepelin through the 1900s, American
psychiatry shifted away from biological psychiatry toward environmental and
psychoanalytical psychiatry (Decker, 341).
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During World War II, soldiers presenting cases of combat neuroses provided a
platform for practicing psychoanalysts. Many psychiatrists witnessed the successes of
these therapeutic interventions and consequently, post-World War II saw a marked
increase in the amount of candidates seeking psychoanalytic education (Decker, 342).
The general belief was that psychoanalysis could alleviate most mental illness. As
opposed to the biological view of mental disorder as brain disease and thus clearly
distinguishable from normal mental functioning, the Freudian view of continuous mental
life became predominant. In addition, the American Psychiatric Association and
psychiatry in general began attending to the social bases of mental disorders.
Accordingly, DSM I and II reflected a psychodynamic slant (Mayes and Horwitz, 249).
The shift away from biological psychiatry to psychodynamic psychiatry after the war
represented a time of optimism for the field at large. This, however, was short lived.
During the 1960s and 1970s, psychiatry was met with growing opposition and
challenges. For one, the chronic state of most patients in state hospitals led to a
depressing and discouraging atmosphere (Decker, 343) and with an inadequate amount
of professional staff, therapeutic treatments were severely lacking. The prolonged
institutionalization of psychiatric patients in combination with unsuccessful treatment
brought about greater scrutiny directed toward the broader practice of
institutionalization and cast doubt on the once optimistic approach of psychoanalysts
and social activists. The image of American psychiatry was growing increasingly
tarnished. The 'anti-psychiatry' movement began to form during the 60s, and its ideas
were even supported by the psychiatrist Thomas Szasz who authored The Myth of
Mental Illness (1961). Szasz argued that psychiatry equated non-conformist behavior
with mental illness and therefore mental illness is a myth. In the year 1973, an article by
the Stanford psychologist and lawyer D. L. Rosenhan was published in the journal
Science, which provided experimental evidence in support of the ideas of Szasz shared
by much of the general public. By demonstrating that individuals merely posing as real
patients could gain admission to psychiatric hospitals based on a single vague
description of an auditory hallucination, the study showed that psychiatrists were
incapable of distinguishing between real and faked symptoms. These findings provided
a tangible source with which to attack the scientific validity of psychiatric diagnoses.
At the end of that same year, the APA made a decision that seemed to confirm
the implications of the Rosenhan experiment; having been pressured and protested by
the Gay Liberation movement for years regarding the diagnosis of 'homosexuality' as a
mental illness, the APA voted to have it removed from the DSM II (APA, 1968). This
decision fueled public criticism regarding the scientific basis for DSM diagnoses; the
simple fact that a 'decision' about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a psychiatric
diagnosis could be made as a result of social pressures reiterated the inadequately
scientific basis for the DSM's method of diagnosis and differentiation between the
mentally well and the mentally ill. American psychiatry was no longer rightfully afforded
a place among other medical specialties and as an autonomous discipline it was in a
state of crisis. To make practical matters worse, third-party payers began refusing to
4

pay psychiatrists for the treatment of illnesses not considered to be 'real diseases'
(Decker, 345). Successful outcomes of treatment needed to be secured, and in the eyes
of third-party payers psychotherapy was incapable of fulfilling that expectation.
In order to salvage its status as a legitimate discipline and alleviate its critical
state, there was a clear historical necessity to return psychiatry to a medically-modeled,
scientific psychiatry. It was around this time that a group of psychiatrists at Washington
University in St. Louis (later considered the 'neo-Kraepelinians') banded together with a
common goal of restoring biological psychiatry in place of psychoanalytic and
environmental psychiatry (Decker, 345). In addition to the necessity at hand, new
findings in psychopharmacology at the time encouraged this Kraepelinian revival.
Specifically, between the 1950s and 1970s, the drugs lithium, chlorpromazine and
imipramine were thought to be successful treatments for mania, schizophrenia and
depression, respectively (Ghaemi). This finding was significant in that it provided a type
of treatment validation for Kraepelin's nosology; a specific correlation between the
administrations of these drugs to the respective disorders suggested that Kraepelin's
classificatory system carried greater therapeutical relevance than Freud's
neurosis-psychosis continuum. In addition, these psychopharmacological discoveries
provided a convenient solution to the practical problems concerning third-party
reimbursement for treatment, i.e., treatments should be for 'real diseases.' It was within
this context that the "Kraepelinian revival" emerged and biological psychiatry became
the dominant approach. With several self-identified neo-Kraepelinians on the task force
for the drafting of DSM III (APA, 1980), it too was a reflection of so-called
"neo-Kraepelinian" principles.
The resurgence of Kraepelinian psychiatry thus appears to have been the
product of, (1) a historical "necessity" to establish a valid and reliable basis for
psychiatric diagnoses and practices in the face of overwhelming public and
professional criticism, as well as (2) apparent treatment validation of Kraepelin's
classifications. It should be asked whether these reasons were sufficient enough to
validate the revival itself. Though it is not the aim of this paper to offer an in-depth
analysis of and answer to that question, a few remarks on the issue will suggest that
perhaps they were not and that this insufficiency, in part, portends the nature of the
problematic deviations of the 'neo-Kraepelinian' DSM from Kraepelin's work.
First, it is important to keep in mind the distinction between (1) the perceived

necessity of some entity to have particular qualities in order to achieve some end result,
and (2) the reality concerning that entity's ability to actually demonstrate or have those
qualities. In other words, the necessity of 'X' having the properties of 'A' and 'B' in order
to achieve 'C', does not validate the assertion that 'X' indeed has the properties of 'A'
and 'B' and therefore achieves 'C'- no matter how dire that necessity is, no matter how
important it is (for whatever reason) that 'X' achieve 'C' and no matter how evident it
may appear that 'X' already achieves 'C'. This is an obvious logical distinction, but still
pertinent in considering whether, when faced with an overwhelming necessity fueled by
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public pressure and scrutiny, the neo-Kraepelinians properly validated their assertions
that, for example, mental illness is brain disease, that it is categorical by nature or that,
as suggested by the DSM III, definitive diagnoses can be made on the basis of signs and
symptoms alone. If true, these properties would allow the practice of psychiatry and its
use of the DSM the status of a legitimate and scientific discipline. Though this would be
clearly beneficial for stakeholders and provide solutions to the problems of psychiatry,
that does not make them true. Asserting the existence of these properties without
sufficient empirical support would lead to their indemonstrability in practice.
Secondly, that the alleged specificity of the above mentioned pharmaceutics to
treat mania, schizophrenia and depression was later found to be empirically weak
(Healy, 849), suggests an unscientific assumption made more so on the basis of
convenience to meet third-party payer's expectation of paying for the treatment of 'real
diseases', rather than rigorous empirical verification. The neo-Kraepelinians relied on
the assumption of agent-specificity in order to establish empirical support for their
nosology. However, the agent specificity itself was not sufficiently empirically
supported. Thus, it appears that neo-Kraepelinian enthusiasm regarding this apparent
correlation and its ability to solve one of psychiatry's central problems took precedence
over the empirical bases they initially tried to establish.
Having illustrated the context of this Kraepelinian revival, as well as some
problems with the foundation of the revival itself, I move on to answering the primary
question of how Kraepelinian the highly revised 'neo-Kraepelin' DSM III actually was.
Specifically, this will be done by (1) an examination of the DSMs translation of
Kraepelin's most well-known work in differentiating the major psychoses, followed by (2)
the ontological differences between and consequences of the respective nosologies in
part III.

Part II Kraepelin Classification vs. DSM III Classification: The Case of the Major
Psychoses
The most borrowed aspect of Kraepelin's work by the DSM III and IV is his
differentiation of the major psychoses into dementia praecox and manic-depressive
insanity (APA, 1980/1994). Kraepelin described manic-depressive insanity as being
characterized by mood excesses and described dementia praecox by two general
'maladies'; dissociative pathology, i.e., disorganization of thought and behavior, and
avolition. But more specifically, it was dissociative pathology closely linked with
avolitional pathology that distinguished dementia praecox from manic-depressive
insanity (Fischer and Carpenter, 2081). The DSM III and IV maintain this nosological
classification of manic-depressive insanity and dementia praecox with bipolar disorder
and schizophrenia, respectively. But a comparison of the DSMs diagnostic criteria for
each with Kraepelin's original construct reveals fundamental differences between the
two.
First, the DSM III adopted the concept of "nuclear schizophrenia" which was
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based on two hypotheses; Schneider's First Rank Symptoms (1959) which were
proposed to be highly discriminating of schizophrenia, and Langfeldt's proposed
distinction between true and pseudoschizophrenia (1969). As a result of incorporating
this concept in the DSM III, the idea that there existed pathognomonic symptoms for
schizophrenia was embraced. In particular, it held that only hallucinations and
delusions or just "bizarre delusions" would satisfy criteria A for schizophrenia (APA,
1980). Kraepelin's dissociative and avolitional pathologies and the close linkage
between the two was not allotted significance at all for the purposes of diagnosis. In
fact, avolition was not even included as a criterion in DSM III. The intention of
incorporating Schneider's hypothesis was to increase inter-rater reliability of diagnoses
(Fischer and Carpenter, 2082), and to be fair, a simple deviation from Kraepelin's
diagnostic criteria for these categories does little more than dampen the connection
and oft referred similarity between the two. But a closer examination shows that the
APA's decision to incorporate it into the DSM was based on presumed construct validity
rather than empirically supported construct validity.
During the late 60s and 70s, Schneider's hypothesis which was central to the
concept of nuclear schizophrenia was tested. It was found that his First Rank
Symptoms were found in psychosis unrelated to schizophrenia, falsifying his hypothesis
that these First Rank Symptoms were pathognomonic to schizophrenic psychosis
(Fischer and Carpenter, 2083). Furthermore, none of the definitions of nuclear
schizophrenia which relied on pathognomonic reality distortion predicted course and
outcome, thus demonstrating poor predictive validity of the diagnostic criteria. Instead,
it was found that the greatest distinction between schizophrenic and non-schizophrenic
psychosis were symptoms of restricted affect, poor rapport and poor insight. Despite
this empirical data that had been available before the publication of the DSM III in 1980,
the validity of nuclear schizophrenia was simply presumed and incorporated into the
diagnostic scheme.
This specific alteration of Kraepelin's original diagnostic criteria directly
contradicts Kraepelin, who was particularly careful to avoid any claims about
pathognomonic symptoms. Specifically, he held that utilizing the idea of pathognomonic
symptoms in diagnostic practice is empirically untenable. (Jablensky, 384). The
falsification of the hypothesis central to nuclear schizophrenia during the 60s and 70s
was at once a confirmation of Kraepelin's position and a testament to the empirically
inadequate methods of determining diagnostic criteria for DSM diagnoses.
The DSM alteration of Kraepelin's original criterion effectively shifted the
diagnostic categories between bipolar disorder and schizophrenia much closer
together (Fischer and Carpenter, 2083). By emphasizing common features and
de-emphasizing the pathological attributes that Kraepelin used to distinguish the
conditions, it also increased the likelihood of false positives in diagnosis. The
phenomenon of psychosis occurs in myriad conditions, many of which are
distinguishable at the level of etiology, i.e., sensory isolation, temporal lobe epilepsy,
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Huntington's disease, and can also occur in reported instances of religious ecstasy
(Fischer and Carpenter, 2081-2). It was determining the nature of the patient's distress
(if any) accompanied by these episodes of psychosis that was important in
distinguishing between psychotic schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. This is what
Kraepelin had done by examining the pattern of pathology associated with each, and it
is precisely what the DSM discarded and replaced with the concept of nuclear
schizophrenia, thereby relying on the idea of pathognomonic signs.
This discrepancy between Kraepelin and the neo-Kraepelinian diagnostic
formulations brings to light another significant difference, and that is Kreapelin's
insistence on viewing the whole of the clinical picture in diagnostic efforts (Decker, 339).
Kraepelin stated in the fifth edition of his textbook that his work is a:
Decisive step from a symptomatic to a clinical view of insanity...The importance
of external clinical signs has...been subordinated to consideration of the
conditions of origin, the course, and the terminus which result from individual
disorders. Thus, all purely symptomatic categories have disappeared from the
nosology (Engstrom, 1995: 294; Kraepelin's italics).
This quote shows that Kraepelin doubted the ability of external clinical signs to
sufficiently define a nosologic category. Kraepelin never even issued a definitive list of
diagnostic criteria for dementia praecox or manic-depressive insanity but rather,
advocated for the consideration of the comprehensive case at hand, including even the
characteristics of the personality being invaded by the illness (Kraepelin, 2002).
In contrast, one of the defining features of the so called 'neo-Kraepelinian' DSM
III and IV (APA, 1980/1994) is a purely symptomatic nosology whereby a detailed
checklist of symptoms can be used as a method toward securing a diagnosis. Thus,
emphasis was placed on the importance of external clinical signs, thereby failing to
consider other factors such as conditions of origin, course of illness, terminus resulting
from disorders, or characteristics of the individual personality being invaded by the
illness. These details are important in developing 'the whole of the clinical picture'
which was the rule Kraepelin taught his students (Kraepelin, 2002). Contrary to this rule,
it has been argued that since the publication of DSM III in 1980, American psychiatric
education has placed increasingly less emphasis on the importance of comprehensively
attending to individual cases (Andreasen, 111). Instead, students are taught to
memorize the symptomatic categories of the DSM nosology, thus neglecting important
aspects of the condition as well as clinical signs potentially detectable through
considering the characteristics of a patient's personality.
Through an evaluation of Kraepelin's enduring contribution to modern
psychiatric nosology, namely the differentiation of [now] bipolar disorder and
schizophrenia, it has been shown that significant alterations were made which
contradict many of Kraepelin's principles, such as the empirical tenability of
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pathognomonic symptoms, definitive diagnostic criteria in general, and the necessity of
considering the entire clinical picture rather than a reliance on pure symptomology.
The consequences of such changes have not only effected patients receiving
differential diagnoses of bipolar disorder and schizophrenia by shifting the two groups
much closer together, but has also lead to a narrowed focus on external clinical signs in
diagnostic efforts. Neither consequence serves the best interest of patients or,
arguably, aspiring clinicians. It has also been shown here that neither alteration in the
DSM III diagnostic scheme would have likely been supported by Kraepelin. Despite this,
these alterations are representative of the practice that the DSM has wholly embraced
in its neo-Kraepelinian reformulation of the DSM. The following section addresses this
expansion in more detail and considers the ontological commitments of both Kraepelin
and the DSM III.

Part III From Kraepelin to the DSM III: From Disease-entities to Disorders and
Syndromes
Emil Kraepelin began by classifying as many cases of mental disorder as
possible based on biological etiology, for example those which were due to infection or
endocrine disorders (Klerman, 100). Such a classification can thus be regarded as
consisting of disease-entities. However, the differentiation for which he is most
well-known- dementia praecox and manic-depressive insanity- was made in the
absence of any discovered pathophysiological explanation. It was based on a presumed
biological etiology instead. Thus, Kraepelin was unable to demonstrate that Dementia
Praecox and manic depressive insanity were actual disease-entities. Consequently, the
division was often criticized (Kraepelin, 1919).
As opposed to Kraepelin, the neo-Kraepelinian revolution of the DSM forfeited
any ontological commitment from the start but, nonetheless, expanded Kraepelin's
nosology beyond the major psychoses to eventually include over 400 diagnoses
including affective disorders (non-psychotic unipolar major depressive disorder being
frequently diagnosed), anxiety disorders (GAD, panic, social anxiety, OCD), personality
disorders, and other conditions such as ADHD and PTSD (APA, 1980/1994). These
changes characterize the shift from Kraepelinian disease-entities to the DSM's
syndromes and disorders. A legitimate assertion that certain mental illnesses are
disease-entities would require a demonstration that such entities have
neuropathological or other biologically-based causal mechanisms or factors. As a
result, valid categorizations could be made if these demonstrations showed that they
are discrete entities with natural biological boundaries that separate them from other
disorders (Kendell and Jablensky, 7). The DSM decision to remain ontologically neutral
resulted in the shift from disease-entities to disorders and syndromes. The latter
categorize mental illness solely on the basis of signs and symptoms, ones that are
frequently observed to cluster or intercorrelate. This "atheoretical" character of the
DSM III and IV means that the diagnostic categories do not (explicitly) involve or
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presuppose any particular theory of etiology or pathology (APA, 1994). Given the
normally assumed connection between theories and ontology, in virtue of atheoreticity,
clinically defined and theoretical DSM categories are applicable to a variety of
ontological positions held by clinicians and researchers in the field of psychiatry.
One problem with the DSM's neo-Kraepelinian divergence described above
occurs in practice, when syndromes and disorders are treated as proxies for diseases.
It has been argued that this assumption is the result of a reification fallacy that occurs
merely as a result of giving diagnostic concepts an official nomenclature and precise
operational definitions (Kendell and Jablensky, 5). Reification in this sense occurs when
DSM-defined diagnoses come into general use and begin to be perceived and utilized as
if they are actual entities that can be unquestionably invoked to explain the patient's
symptoms. However, since most diagnostic concepts defined by their syndromes have
not been shown to have natural boundaries separating them from other disorders, they
should not be regarded as valid (Kendell and Jablensky, 5). Furthermore, it is argued by
Ghaemi that symptoms 'hypertrophied' into diagnoses appear to provide justification for
medication, since clinicians often make biological assumptions about treatment. Thus,
he argues that the neo-Kraepelinian attempt to stay neutral ontologically is, in practice,
trumped by biological assumptions regarding treatment. Assuming Ghaemi's ideas to
be correct, elaboration on his claims would be helpful in understanding more
specifically why DSM diagnoses appear to provide justification for treatment with
medication and why clinicians tend to make biological assumptions about treatment.
If reification of DSM diagnostic concepts can occur without any resultant
specificity in regards to the treatment of conditions falling under such concepts, and if
Ghaemi's argument is correct, then there must be a secondary assumption contributing
to the truth of his claim. I side with Ghaemi, and thus posit that there is a secondary
assumption at work, namely, the assumption that mental illness is brain disease. This
assumption can easily be derived from the denial of dualism stated in the DSM itself;
"the term mental disorder unfortunately implies a distinction between 'mental'
disorders and 'physical' disorders that is a reductionist anachronism of
mind/body dualism...There is much 'physical' in 'mental' disorders and much
'mental' in 'physical' disorders...unfortunately the term [mental] persists in the
title of DSM-IV because we have not found an appropriate substitute" (APA,
1994).
What this statement amounts to is the conclusion that there is no significant distinction
between the mind and the brain for the purposes of psychiatry. If there is no significant
distinction here, then anything regarded as 'mental' is conceptually reducible to the
physical and vice versa. Therefore it can be said that 'mental' illness is really not
different in any significant way from 'physical' illness, i.e., brain illness or brain disease.
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It is generally regarded as a metaphysically extravagant notion to assert a
fundamental distinction between the mind and the brain, and as such it is commonly
rejected in scientific communities. Psychiatry, although dealing explicitly with 'mental'
activity, e.g., consciousness, subjectivity and intentionality, nonetheless reject dualism.
A common misconception which may contribute to this assumption is that psychiatry
has proven dualism to be false (Cooper, 104-105). To elaborate, it is not incompatible
with a dualist position to accept that neuroscientific research has shown correlations
between properties of the brain and subjective experiences. For example, a dualist can
accept that a brain scan gives good reasons to think someone is in pain by offering a
reliable marker for pain, rather than offering evidence of the pain itself. Similarly, it is
compatible with a dualist position that in certain cases medications reliably bring about
changes in mood. Therefore these reasons are not reasons to reject dualism.
It is not my aim here to offer a defense dualism, but rather to draw attention to
some significant implications that accompany a clear denial of it. For one, it seems to
suggest a false dichotomy; if the mind is not the brain, then the mind is a mystical,
inexplicable entity that does not belong to the realm of science. This is a false
dichotomy because the idea of the mind as something fundamentally distinct from the
brain is not incompatible with neuroscientific findings. Additionally, this false dichotomy
excludes from the outset any alternative theories of mind, such that it is an information
processor or a process itself rather than a 'thing' reducible to other physical 'things.' A
priori exclusions such as these are not only based on misconceptions of dualism but
also stymy potential developments in psychiatry that could not only be consistent with a
scientific model but potentially provide a revolutionary way of understanding mental
activity.
The considerations discussed above help to elucidate Ghaemi's claim that the
neo-Kraepelinian neutral ontology contributes to diagnostic confusion since clinicians
often make biological assumptions concerning treatment. In other words, the difficulty
in the neo-Kraepelinian attempt to remain ontologically neutral becomes apparent when
considering the context in which that supposed neutrality is immersed, i.e., one in
which psychiatry is viewed as a definitively scientific discipline, misconceptions of
dualism lead to the exclusion of potentially viable theories of mind and thus the
acceptance of mental illness as nothing other than brain disease prevails. Thus it seems
to be a reification phenomenon occurring within this context that appears to justify
treatment with medication and that explains, at least in part, why clinicians tend to
make biological assumptions regarding treatment for DSM diagnoses. Consequently,
there appears to be at least some degree of incompatibility between the supposed
ontological neutrality of the DSM and an unquestioned denial of dualism, because the
latter implies a biological theoreticity in the form of the dictum 'mental illness is brain
disease', rather than theoretical neutrality. One cannot logically claim neutrality with
respect to the ontology of mental illness while also asserting (directly or indirectly) that
mental illness is nothing other than brain disease.
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The result, as Ghaemi argues, is the justification of medication for the treatment
of DSM-defined disorders. For, if mental illness is brain disease, and if brain diseases
are treated with medication, then it should be sufficient to treat mental illnesses with
medication. Ghaemi provides an example of this phenomenon using the rather new
diagnosis of Adult ADHD. This condition, not even recognized in the psychiatric
literature until the 1990s, carried little evidence of nosological validity. While the
National Comorbidity Survey analysis found that 3% of the adult population met criteria
for the condition, 84.1% of this population were also diagnosable with mood disorders.
While these statistics suggest a lack of syndromal specificity and diagnostic invalidity,
there was a significant increase in the diagnosis of adult ADHD in 2002 after a new drug
had been marketed in the U.S. to treat its symptoms.
This example, in addition to showing that DSM diagnoses appear to provide
justification for treatment with medication, also shows that the apparent specificity of a
drug to treat the symptoms of a condition outweighs other evidence that suggests the
nosologic invalidity of the condition itself. If there were strong empirical demonstrability
that specific drugs worked for specific conditions, then this would provide some
empirical justification for diagnostic categories. However this is not the case, as seen
with problems of comorbidity and the lack of specificity of most current
psychopharmacological treatments. Aragona argues that in cases such as these, the
problem is rooted in the heterogeneity of DSM diagnostic categories, and not the drugs
themselves (5). To elaborate, the testing of psychopharmacological drugs becomes
problematic in that it relies on the formal DSM-diagnoses given to a group of test
subjects. Thus, the empirical performance of the drugs is reliant on the rules which
contributed to the conceptual construction of those diagnostic categories. Problems
with the nature of these constructions (lack of specificity of symptoms, lack of
qualitative determination and use of a polythetic rule coupled with a quantitative
diagnostic threshold) allow for patients who have received the same formal diagnosis to
retain many significant differences. These differences become uncontrolled variables in
experiments that aim to test the specificity of certain drugs to treat certain DSM
diagnoses. From an understanding of this problem, it follows that positive correlations
between drug treatments and alleviation of symptoms provide only weak empirical
validation, i.e., treatment validation of DSM diagnostic categories. In this sense,
treatment validation of diagnostic categories effectually masks problems of
heterogeneity and encourages the assumption that DSM-defined disorders and
syndromes are valid, as seen with the increased diagnoses of Adult ADHD concurrent
with a new drug marketed for it.
This interplay of DSM diagnoses and the medications purported to treat them has
a second and perhaps more obvious consequence; treatment that is designed to
eliminate only symptoms. Since psychiatric conditions are defined by their signs and
symptoms, there are no objective tests (standard methods objectively applicable to any
12

patient which exclude the subjectivity of relying on verbal expression and interpretation)
with which to validate suspected diagnoses. This is perhaps the primary and most
consequentially detrimental way in which psychiatry deviates from other medical
disciplines.
Consider, for example, an Endocrinologist seeing a patient who is suspected of
having diabetes mellitus. The physician might suspect this diagnosis based on
patient-reported symptoms of fatigue, excess thirst and blurry vision. The physician
may also find high levels of sugar in a urine analysis. These symptoms, though
commonly seen in patients with diabetes, could manifest in an array of medical
conditions and do not represent the variation of symptoms that can be present. In no
way do they, by themselves, indicate the presence of a particular medical condition. It
is the physician's job to determine the possibilities and the most probable conditions
that would be the cause of the signs and symptoms. Part of this process involves
considering the individual case at hand. For example, the physician might find that
although the patient is a normal weight (while obesity is a common associated
condition), they practice risk behaviors for developing diabetes such as excess alcohol
consumption. All such details still do not confirm a medical diagnosis of diabetes.
Instead, signs and symptoms as well as a consideration of the individual patient, direct
the physician to order particular objective tests, e.g., specific blood tests, in order to
confirm or rule out the suspected diagnoses. Once this is done, medication is justifiably
prescribed to correct the underlying biological process. In this case it would most likely
be insulin to correct the insulin deficiency which caused the condition and the resulting
symptoms to begin with. Therefore symptoms are alleviated by virtue of the
medications that target the underlying pathophysiological processes that caused them
in the first place.
In contrast, modern diagnostic practices based on the DSM not only bypass the
individual and environmental factors that could indicate a particular condition (like
obesity or alcoholism in the case of diabetes) but also makes definitive diagnoses on
the symptoms alone. As discussed, such diagnoses are often followed by unjustified
prescriptions of medications. They are unjustified because their employment alone
presumes a biological cause correctable with a specific type of medication without
there being a known biological cause. The consequence is that only outward symptoms
are treated, masking and allowing any underlying mechanism to continue. The idea of
any other medical discipline practicing this way is nearly unimaginable. In the absence
of objective tests which validate suspected diagnoses by detecting underlying
biological causes, psychiatric diagnoses are subjectively made on the basis of
interpreted signs and symptoms alone.

Part IV What should be done?
In 1887 Kraepelin lectured that "Unlike other branches of medicine, psychiatry
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has to do with two fundamentally different categories of phenomena...The impossibility
of a satisfactory solution to the fundamental psycho-physical problem inherent to
psychiatry has had two consequences...numerous attempts to bridge the gap
separating events of the body and mind by means of airy constructions of speculative
fantasy...[and]...a strict and resigned determination to focus only on establishing what
is real" (Kraepelin, 1887/2005: 351).
In an attempt to avoid the former, the neo-Kraepelinians aimed to establish the latter,
but failed due to an inherently flawed approach that focused solely on symptoms.
Though Kraepelin relied in part on symptoms for his differentiation of dementia praecox
and manic-depressive insanity, he acknowledged the limitations of doing so, and
toward the end of his career even admitted that "we must, then, accustom ourselves to
the idea that the phenomena of illness which he have hitherto used are not sufficient to
enable us to distinguish reliably between manic-depressive illness and schizophrenia in
all cases" (1920/1974: 29). Had sufficient evidence supported Kraepelin's belief that the
ultimate validation of this differentiation would come from neuropathology, physiology
and biological chemistry of the brain (Jablensky, 383), then it would serve as support
for his nosology, providing a biological explanation that went beyond symptoms.
Similarly, many of the issues discussed in this paper concerning the neo-Kraepelinian
DSM would not be existent or relevant if sufficient empirical evidence supported the
delineation of the myriad DSM-defined conditions. However as of today, only 3% of
psychiatric conditions have been causally established (Stevenson). Therefore it is likely
that for the other 97%, Kraepelin would have denied reliability of differentiating them for
the purposes of diagnosis, just as he did regarding his own work.
Kraepelin held the belief that scientific knowledge comes only through empirical
research. Similarly, the neo-Kraepelinians believed that only empirical psychiatric
research with a focus on biology held any hope for the improvement of psychiatric
practice (Decker, 339). Kraepelin attempted to establish the applicability of a medical
model to psychiatry, and the neo-Kraepelinians assert that psychiatry is a medical
discipline adhering to a medical model (Klerman, 104). If the goal is to ground the
practice of psychiatry on valid and reliable bases comparable to other medical
disciplines, then the data acquired and the diagnoses made must be validated by
objective tests.
In response to the fifth and latest edition of the DSM published in May of 2013, the
National Institute of Mental Health has proposed a new project, Research Domain
Criteria (RDoC), which rejects the use of DSM categories from the outset, since doing
so simply presumes DSM classifications to be accurate reflections of the reality of
mental illness, thereby excluding any objective findings which are not consistent with
DSM categories (Insel). The RDoC project will begin by "collecting the genetic, imaging,
physiologic, and cognitive data to see how it all clusters – not just the symptoms – and
how these clusters relate to treatment response..." (Insel).
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A significant shift away from the current DSM categories is necessary in order to
make claims about reliability and validity. There is no doubt that the above approach
would provide an objective source of information geared toward identifying biological
causal processes of mental illnesses. However, it would be a mistake to assert that
such a model would have the ability to address the whole of clinical psychiatry, since
doing so would presume that all psychiatric symptoms, conditions and cases are
merely biological. This presumption would dismiss the unique feature of psychiatry that
even Kraepelin acknowledged in his statement "...Psychiatry has to do with two
fundamentally different categories of phenomena..." (1887/2005: 351) by assuming the
reducibility of all mental activity to physical activity. This is why caution regarding
extrapolations of the project's findings to the entire realm of mental life and illness
would be important in order to avoid prematurely assuming a fundamentally biological
basis to every individual psychiatric case from the simple fact that some conditions
have been found to have biological bases. This is similar to the misconception
occurring in the rejection of dualism; since neuroscience has identified correlations
between brain activity and subjective states, all subjective states must be correlated
with or caused by brain activity. Instead, a system like this should be used as an
objective guide for clinicians, giving them a better idea of what diagnoses are likely
biological disease-entities and which are not, and therefore better equipping them to
make decisions regarding which type of treatment is prima facie appropriate for
individual cases.

Conclusion
The Kraepelinian revival characterizing modern psychiatry began on a shaky,
unscientific foundation. With social pressures mounting and threatening the discipline
of psychiatry as whole, there was a historical necessity to establish its scientific validity
and reliability. Overzealously made correlations between discoveries of drugs and their
ability to specifically treat certain disorders provided only a weak empirical basis for
using and expanding a Kraepelinian nosology. The latter of these factors which
contributed to its revival foreshadowed the practice that has consumed modern
psychiatry, namely the use of prescription medications for treatment of symptoms and
empirically weak treatment validations of DSM diagnostic concepts.
The actual implementation of Kraepelin's work in the neo-Kraepelinian DSM III
and IV differed from Kraepelin in crucial ways which exacerbated the reasons for the
criticism of psychiatry to begin with, i.e., low reliability and low validity, or otherwise
high reliability at the expense of validity and thus widespread and consistently
inaccurate diagnoses. The reification of DSM diagnostic concepts in conjunction with
the ontological shift from disease-entities to syndromes and disorders lead to the
justification and unquestioned treatment of these reified concepts with medication. The
fact that diagnoses and respective treatments address only superficial symptoms
contradicts the neo-Kraepelinian claim that psychiatry practices as a legitimate
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medical discipline, and persists in the name of Kraepelin despite his acknowledgment
of the inadequacy of such approaches.

As a result, once again the discipline of psychiatry has found itself in a state of
continued crisis. The recent research proposal by the National Institute of Mental
Health moves psychiatric research in a more promising direction by liberating itself
from the constraints of DSM categories. By endeavoring to gather through
neuroscience and genetics a collection of objective data, the RDoC more accurately
follows Kraepelinian goals than have the neo-Kraepelinians in their reliance on
symptoms. Nonetheless, the nature of psychiatry demands that a method which gathers
objective, biological data comprises only a partial picture of it, not to be viewed as
sufficiently holistic. Doing so would unjustifiably exclude other potentially viable
perspectives. While science provides an avenue for the search of empirically tenable,
reliable and valid aspects of psychiatry, there is no justification in assuming that these
aspects comprise a complete understanding of the complexities of the human mind.
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